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Abstract 
Sound ALM practices ensure the stability and liquidity of banks, thus enhancing the profitability. ALM is a mechanism to 
address the risk faced by banks due to mismatch in assets and liabilities. In the context of India, banking industry is closely 
monitored and supervised by Reserve Bank of India (RBI). As a part of many norms to ensure the sound banking system, RBI 
also has come out with the comprehensive framework on ALM that the banks in India has to follow. It includes measures such as 
earnings and economic value approach, traditional gap analysis, earnings-at-risk method, duration gap analysis, simulation 
method and funds transfer pricing. The scheduled commercial banks (SCBs) in India are divided into five categories based on 
bank group by RBI. They are, State Bank of India (SBI) and Associates, Nationalised Banks, Old Private Sector Banks, New 
Private Sector Banks and Foreign Banks. There could be differences between the banks based on bank groups in ALM. Therefore 
this study attempts to find out the differences in ALM of Indian banks based on bank groups. The empirical result suggests that 
there is a significant difference in the gap ratio amongst the bank groups. The null hypothesis can be rejected. 
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Contribution to the Body of Knowledge: 
The present study is on the less explored asset liability management and its techniques. This study identifies the 
asset liability management strategies followed by banks in India. Maturity gap analysis technique is used in the 
study. The study hypothesizes that bank group could have a significant effect on the asset liability management 
strategies and hence attempts to find out if there are any differences between the bank groups. There are very few 
studies done in this area. The outcome of the study is significant for both practitioners and academicians. 
1. Introduction 
In the changed banking scenario, one of the important areas that the banks are concentrating is Asset-Liability 
Management (ALM). The recent global financial turmoil can be largely attributed to mismanagement of assets and 
liabilities by large financial institutions. In this context, banks are now taking ALM more serious than ever. Sound 
ALM practices ensure the stability and liquidity of banks, thus enhancing the profitability. ALM is a mechanism to 
address the risk faced by banks due to mismatch in assets and liabilities. The mismatch may be because of maturity 
profile or due to interest rate structures. Any such mismatch in will lead banks into trouble. For instance, if assets 
are bearing fixed interest rate and liabilities are bearing floating interest rates, any rise in interest rate would axe the 
net interest margin of the banks. Similarly if the maturity of the assets is longer than that of liability, bank may face 
liquidity crisis. ALM unifies the liquidity and profitability of the banks. Therefore it is imperative to monitor the 
status of assets and liabilities constantly. The goal of ALM is not eliminating the risk but to manage the risk 
amicably between risk, liquidity and profitability (Bruce, 2004). Having faced with increasing volatility in interest 
rates and severe competition in fund formation, the banks are now paying more attention to fund formation and 
monitoring of deposit value and its structure, as well as the state of non-deposit liabilities (Lileikiene, 2008).  
Alongside, with the increased use of technology and computing power in the banks, ALM could find with a new and 
broader function to perform (Black, Brown, & Moloney, 2003). To attract globally competent talents to do this job, 
banks are paying a very high remuneration for the talents performing this job (Walters, 2003). This reiterates the 
importance of ALM. In the post liberlisation era, with large deregulation in banking sector and due to intense 
competition, efficient management of assets and liabilities became imperative for survival of banks.  
2. Asset Liability Management Process and Techniques  
In the context of India, banking industry is closely monitored and supervised by Reserve Bank of India (RBI). As a 
part of many norms to ensure the sound banking system, RBI also has come out with the comprehensive framework 
on ALM that the banks in India has to follow. It includes measures such as earnings and economic value approach, 
traditional gap analysis, earnings-at-risk method, duration gap analysis, simulation method and funds transfer 
pricing. Besides, there are many research studies on application of various techniques in ALM. Goal programming 
model with simulation analysis technique in ALM was found effective in solving conflicting goals such as returns, 
425 Krishna Prasad and K.R. Suprabha  /  Procedia Economics and Finance  11 ( 2014 )  423 – 430 
liquidity and solvency (Kosmidou & Zopounidis, 2004). Optimisation scenario methodology for ALM, which can 
be even applied in stochastic interest rate environment was found useful in bank’s strategic planning (Kosmidou & 
Zopounidis, 2002). Continuous-Time model and multi-period models were used to fit safety first principle to ALM 
(Chiu & Li, 2009). However, maturity gap analysis is one of the widely followed techniques of ALM in India.  
 
Maturity Gap analysis distributes interest rate sensitive assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet positions into a 
certain number of pre-defined time-bands according to their maturity in case of fixed rate and time remaining for 
their next repricing  in the case of floating rate assets and liabilities. Those assets and liabilities lacking definite 
repricing intervals, such as, savings bank, cash credit, overdraft, loans, export finance, refinance from RBI etc. If 
actual maturities differ from contractual maturities, may be due to embedded option in bonds with put/call options, 
loans, cash credit/overdraft, time deposits, etc. are assigned to a time-bands according to the judgment based on the 
past experiences of banks.  
 
To evaluate the earnings exposure, interest Rate Sensitive Assets (RSAs) in each time bucket are netted with the 
interest Rate Sensitive Liabilities (RSLs) to produce a repricing ‘Gap’ for that time band. The positive Gap indicates 
that banks have more RSAs than RSLs. A positive or asset sensitive Gap means that an increase in market interest 
rates could cause an increase in NII. Conversely, a negative or liability sensitive Gap implies that the banks’ NII 
could decline as a result of increase in market interest rates. The negative gap indicates that banks have more RSLs 
than RSAs. The Gap is used as a measure of interest rate sensitivity. The Positive or Negative Gap is multiplied by 
the assumed interest rate changes to derive the Earnings at Risk (EaR). The EaR method facilitates to estimate how 
much the earnings might be impacted by an adverse movement in interest rates. The changes in interest rate could be 
estimated on the basis of past trends, forecasting of interest rates, etc. The banks may fix EaR which could be based 
on last or current year’s income. Trigger point may be fixed at which the line management should implement on-or 
off-balance sheet hedging strategies. This method is simple yet effective. Nevertheless, banks use duration gap 
analysis in conjunction to maturity gap analysis to overcome the drawbacks of the former.  
3. Anomalies in Scheduled Commercial Banks in India 
The scheduled commercial banks (SCBs) in India are divided into five categories based on bank group by RBI. 
They are, State Bank of India (SBI) and Associates, Nationalised Banks, Old Private Sector Banks, New Private 
Sector Banks and Foreign Banks. There are several studies referring to the differences in the various parameters 
between these bank groups. The empirical results of the study conducted by Koevya (2003) suggested that 
ownership type has a significant effect on some performance indicators. Partially privatized banks seemed to be 
catching up fast with fully private banks as no significant difference was found in financial performance and 
efficiency between them (Sathye, 2003).  Bhaumik & Piesse (2007) found the differences in the allocation of assets, 
risk, treatment of NPA and ability of banks to recover doubtful with ownership between the bank groups. Pallavi 
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Singh (2012) concluded that the public sector banks were dull moving, whereas private Banks have been fast on the 
uptake and are reorienting their strategies. However, public sector banks reveal a modest growth in productivity that 
appears to have been brought about by technological change while the private sector banks showed no growth 
(Galagedera & Edirisuriya, 2005). Another study observed that the public sector banks have achieved a greater 
penetration compared to the private sector banks vis-à-vis the weaker sections (Swamy, 2001). Finding of study by 
Rajaraman et al. (1999) pointed out that ownership has a part to play in the banking efficiency and technology. 
There could be differences between the banks based on bank groups in ALM. But there are not many studies on the 
ALM between the bank groups. Therefore this study attempts to find out the differences in ALM of Indian banks 
based on bank groups.  
4. Objective and Methodology  
The main objective of the study is to analyze the present status of ALM in banks and to find out the relationship 
between maturity gap and ownership groups.  
 
Hypothesis 1: There is no significant difference in the maturity gap of the banks in different ownership structure. 
All the 46 scheduled commercial banks in India except foreign banks are chosen for the present study. Foreign 
banks are not chosen for the study as their contribution to the Indian banking industry is small and are having a 
small operation in India. Hence studying their ALM will not make a significant difference in the study. Maturity gap 
ratio of these banks are considered for finding the ALM effectiveness. For this purpose, Rate Sensitive Assets and 
Liabilities of individual banks are computed based on the information available in the Statistical Tables Related to 
Banks in India, published by Reserve Bank of India. Maturity gap under eight time buckets, as disclosed by RBI is 
calculated using following formula: 
 
Maturity Gap = Rate Sensitive Assets - Rate Sensitive Liabilities 
 
For the purpose comparison, ratio between RSAs and RSLs are calculated as given below:   
 
Maturity Gap Ratio = Rate Sensitive Assets ÷ Rate Sensitive Liabilities 
 
The gap ratio is considered as outcome variable for the purpose of this study. Ownership group and time buckets are 
considered as predictor variables. The data is statistically tested using one-way repeated measures anova. 
5. Findings 
The banks raise funds by accepting deposits and by Tier I, II, III capital. The time duration of these liabilities differ 
based on the type of instrument issued. Similarly, banks lend loan of different time duration based on the demand of 
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the client. Apart from this banks will have to make some statutory investments such as SLR requirements. The 
operations of the banks are spread across a vast geographical area and its difficult for the banks to take decisions of 
accepting deposits and lending credit based on the maturity at the aggregate level. Therefore there will be some 
differences in the maturity profile of the assets and liabilities. However, in the ideal environment maturity should 
exactly match to minimize the liquidity risk of the banks. In the real time banking business scenario it is not 
possible. It is the responsibility of the banks to review the maturity profile of assets and liabilities frequently, 
desirably on a real time basis. On review if any mismatches beyond the acceptable limits are found banks should 
initiate the corrective actions such as, stop accepting deposits for specific time duration and so on. If this is done 
across the banks at the same seriousness then the gaps in the RSA and RSL would be at the acceptable region. 
The details of RSAs and RSLs of SCBs according to the bank group are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Rate Sensitive Assets and Liabilities of SCBs as on March 2012 
           (Rs. in Crore) 
  
SBI and Associate 
Banks Nationalised Banks 
Old Private Sector 
Banks 
New Private Sector 
Banks 
RSA RSL RSA RSL RSA RSL RSA RSL 
1 - 14 days 82,029.10 
111,222.9
0 
320,331.6
0 
357,693.5
0 9,123.20 
23,953.
60 
123,533.9
0 
108,961.2
0 
15 - 28 days 19,595.70 30,421.20 99,159.40 
127,648.5
0 40,818.90 
9,084.8
0 36,294.90 41,845.60 
29 days to 3 
months 92,066.70 
102,810.8
0 
488,609.9
0 
622,672.4
0 31,755.50 
47,768.
20 
102,882.9
0 
140,735.9
0 
Over 3 
months to 6 
months 61,883.80 
135,786.4
0 
352,140.8
0 
513,732.6
0 49,686.70 
43,885.
10 98,327.80 
138,630.0
0 
Over 6 
months to 1 
year 82,021.20 
188,996.4
0 
398,780.6
0 
822,870.9
0 96,903.00 
60,246.
70 
135,106.0
0 
201,902.7
0 
Over 1 year 
to 3 years 
594,043.0
0 
445,416.9
0 
1,090,382.
70 
914,570.8
0 35,304.60 127,135 
379,086.8
0 
283,632.2
0 
Over 3 years 
to 5 years 
183,488.2
0 
243,390.6
0 
492,459.1
0 
299,749.2
0 73,589.20 
23,435.
30 
144,673.4
0 96,189.50 
Over 5 years 
454,965.2
0 
308,624.7
0 
1,050,945.
70 
677,465.4
0 
153,542.6
0 
21,942.
70 
282,891.4
0 
249,609.8
0 
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Total 
 
1,570,092.
90 
1,566,669
.90 
4,292,809.
80 
4,336,403
.30 
490,723.7
0 
357,451
.60 
1,302,797
.10 
1,261,506
.90 
Source: Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India, 2012, RBI, Mumbai  
 
The asset in the buckets above one year, especially three to five year and five year and above buckets constitute a 
major chunk of the total assets and liabilities of the banks. The results of the study concluded by Rakhe (2012) 
indicated that long-term loans have a higher impact on the gross income of the Indian banking sector as compared 
with short term loans. With every one per cent increase in long term loans, gross income of SCBs increased by 1.07 
per cent. While, one per cent increase in short term loans increased the gross income of SCBs by 0.42 per cent. 
Therefore, it is apparent that banks have an enticement lending more long-term loans even though in the process 
they create a mismatch of assets and liabilities in the long-term buckets which is riskier in declining interest rate 
scenario. The maturity gap of the SCBs which is arrived by deducting RSLs from RSAs is shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.  Maturity Gap Ratio of SCBs as on March 2012 
 Bank Group 
1 - 14 
days 
15 - 28 
days 
29 days 
to 3 
months 
Over 3 
months 
to 6 
months 
Over 6 
months 
to 1 
year 
Over 1 
year to 
3 years 
Over 3 
years to 
5 years 
Over 5 
years 
SBI and Associate 
Banks 0.78 3.16 1.27 0.61 0.14 0.26 5.05 0.70 
Nationalised Banks 0.92 2.69 0.15 0.96 0.43 0.50 7.92 2.74 
Old Private Sector 
Banks 0.47 1.34 0.98 0.76 0.82 0.87 2.42 17.29 
New Private Sector 
Banks 0.94 2.93 0.20 0.78 0.64 0.64 11.65 11.16 
Source: Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India, 2012, RBI, Mumbai  
 
The bucket wise distributions of maturity gaps depicts that Nationalized Banks and SBI and Associate Banks are 
following the negative gap strategy for the time buckets upto one year which indicates that the short term liabilities 
are more than short term assets. Conversely, in the one year to three year, three to five years and over five year time 
buckets these banks are following a positive gap strategy. New Private Sector Banks and Old Private Sector Banks 
seem to have a positive gap in one to fourteen days bucket. This shows that these banks have a more short term 
assets than liabilities. This may be attributed to the large credit card loans by these banks. However, irrespective of 
the bank group, the time buckets over one year we see the positive gaps in the scheduled commercial banks of India. 
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Most of the contribution to the total gap of Nationalized Banks, SBI and Associate Banks and Old Private Sector 
Banks are from over five year buckets. While in case of New Private Sector Banks the concentration of gap is in the 
one year to three year buckets.  
 
The concentration of positive gap in over five year bucket in the SCBs can be seen as an effort to increase the 
profitability. This analysis shows that over a period of time, the financing of long-term assets by short-term 
liabilities has increased in the Indian banking sector leading to positive gap. It is no doubt a profitable proposition 
especially when India is seeing a raising interest rate regime. But this may pose a serious threat to liquidity of these 
banks if not taken seriously (“Banks’ ALM worsens in 2011-12, show RBI data,” 2013). 
 
There is wide difference in the ALM strategies followed by various banks. Ownership/bank group structure may 
also have an influence on the same. For instance, we can observe a very narrow gap in case of new private sector 
banks, while the gap widens in case of nationalized banks. However, this may be seen as the gaps shown in Table 1 
are arithmetic average of all the banks in each group and average is not a good tool for arriving at a conclusion. 
Even more, the table shows the gap at aggregate level and not at individual bank level. In reality, there may be 
differences in the strategies followed by banks in various groups. Hence, to find out if there are any differences in 
the ALM amongst the bank group the gap ratio of the individual banks across bank groups are statistically tested 
using one-way repeated measures anova. 
 
The significance value is 0.000, which is less than 0.05, this means that the variances of the differences in the 
maturity gap ratio between the banks is significantly different. In other words the assumption of the sphericity has 
been violated, χ2 = 924.76, ρ < 0.05. Therefore Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used. F is significant because its 
ρ value is 0.001, which is less than 0.05. Hence it can be concluded that there is a significant difference in the gap 
ratio amongst the bank groups. The null hypothesis can be rejected.  
6. Conclusion 
The past research indicated that bank group and ownership type has significant impact on performance, NPA 
management, risk etc. This study intended to find out if this holds good even in ALM strategies followed by them. 
The empirical result of the study suggests that the differences are found between the bank groups in ALM strategies 
followed by them. The study concluded that there are significant differences in the gap ratio of the banks. But the 
study fails to identify the source of such differences. The further studies in this area could throw light on the source 
of such differences. 
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